Why Newmont was Fined GH¢7 million ….After Spillage Incident At Ahafo Mine In October

WRITTEN BY EDMUND SMITH-ASANTE

Mining giant Newmont Ghana Gold Limited (NGGL), has been slapped with a GH¢ 7 million penalty by the government, after investigations into what the company labeled as an overflow of process solution, which occurred at its Ahafo mine last year in October.
The overflow, which happened on October 8, 2009, generated a lot of interest and anxiety amongst industry players and stakeholders, which culminated in the setting up of investigations into the incident.
First to conduct its investigations was regulatory body, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which at some point received flak for its complexity in the issue.
However, the EPA, after its investigations into the incident came up with recommendations including a deterrent fine, which was upheld by a Ministerial Panel constituted to examine the EPA report and advise government accordingly.
The EPA recommended that the company (NEWMONT) must be directed to pay a fine for violating certain provisions of the environmental permit, deliberately holding information on the spill from EPA, till 10th October 2009 , 3 days after incident, adding that “The fine must be deterrent in nature to the company and other players of the industry.”
The Agency also asked that Newmont be made to provide permanent, potable and adequate water for communities affected by the spill, submit to the Agency its emergency response procedures and incident classification criteria for review and conduct
comprehensive studies on soils and on sediments within the operational area to trace the high sources of the metal concentrations.
While upholding the recommendations of the EPA, the Ministerial Panel chaired by Deputy Minister of Environment, Science and Technology, Dr. Omane Boamah, stated that NGGL be made to pay an amount of GH¢7,000,000.00 (Seven million Ghana Cedis)
as compensation.
In recommending allocation of the compensation, the panel said 45% of the amount should go to the communities affected to meet some development needs, 40% to the EPA and the remaining 15% to the Inspectorate Division of the Minerals Commission.
The Panel also proposed that Newmont map out high risk operational areas and heighten surveillance, review incident classification criteria and prompt reporting procedures and enhance the capacities at all levels in handling of incidents.
It also advised NGGL to educate staff on Environmental Response Procedures and carry out regular drills and tasked the Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology to ensure the institution of a regime for compensation and fines relating to such matters.
The aforementioned recommendations from the Ministerial panel, however flowed from the proposals from the EPA after its investigations which cited NGGL for many lapses.
The Agency, which issued an environmental permit to the gold mining company in line with part 1 sections 1(1) and 3 of LI1652, June 1999 on 25th April 2005, as a first step reviewed the permit conditions, which revealed that NGGL violated section 13.0(b)on CIP operations of the schedule, which stipulates that “the company shall put in place appropriate measures to detect and contain any accidental spill of process effluent . ” The EPA said the emphases lay on “detection” and “containment.” which the company failed to comply with.
The Agency said the company also failed to identify any unforeseen effects as indicated in schedule 19.0 on monitoring. “It is also believed that the NGGL could have predicted the potential risk associated with the simultaneous operations of the three facilities i.e. event pond, raw water dam and the process water pond,” a report on the investigations conducted into the incident cited.
According to the report sighted by GO, the activities leading to the incident were also poorly managed and the occurrence of the incident could have been avoided. “Furthermore the immediate management and investigations conducted and disclosure of information to regulatory institutions and communities were inappropriate and the NGGL could be said to have been negligent in all aspects,” it added.
The report thus drew the conclusions that;
1) The company violated sections 13.0(B) and 19.0 of the Environmental Permit issued on 25th April 2005 .
2) Results of the laboratory analysis as indicated in 4.2 shows negligible values for free , weak acid dissociable and total cyanides;
3) Even though the company was undertaking routine annual plant maintenance programme, activities leading to the spill could have been avoided .The company had been negligent in operating simultaneously the event pond, process water pond and the raw water pond without physical presence of an employee and said to be depending only on the level probe/automatic level monitor;
4) Incident management i.e relay of information to relevant company officials e.g . Environmental Manager (EM) was inappropriate. The EM was immediately not informed to give directions and this resulted in the company not following sampling protocol immediately after the incident;
5) The result of the sampling analysis cannot be used as a measure of the extent of the damage since according to the EM the team did not follow the required protocol until Saturday, the 13th October,2009 when he (EM) joined the sampling team;
6) The volume of process solution that entered the external environment could not be established and the quantity of the 11m3 as solution spilled was incorrect;
7) The company’s inability to inform the regulatory bodies and the downstream communities immediately after the incident was inappropriate, unacceptable and is tantamount to a cover up irrespective of the claim by the company that the incident did not qualify to be reported as per its internal incident classification criteria.
For its part, the Ministerial Panel deduced that the company’s acts and omissions relating to pre-incident, during the incident and post incident activities in terms were inappropriate.
These were in terms of application of hypochlorite without effective assessment and evaluation of the spillage characteristics, delay in notifying the regulatory bodies, delay in notifying the downstream communities and improper environmental sampling. (The basis of the company using results of laboratory analysis when the requisite samples, according to their Environmental Manager, were taken without following the necessary sampling protocol).
The Panel thus concluded that NGGL was negligent for operating the raw water, process water and event ponds simultaneously without appropriate surveillance/physical presence and in its post incident management in terms of internal and external notifications.
It also stated that delayed notification of the incident, coupled with the absence of storage of duplicate samples, strongly points to a cover up.
There was system failure because the initial detection of fish kill was made by the community instead of the company, there were denials of the occurrence of the incident in relation to the fish kill, under estimation of the volume of the spill, the fact that NGGL believed the incident was contained and an incorrect tracing of the direction of flow of the spill, the Panel added.
The Ministerial Panel further submitted that although NGGL delayed in notifying the EPA, the EPA could have commenced investigations immediately on the receipt of the notification of the incident, disclosing that there is no regime for compensations and penalties relating to such incidents.
The Panel’s report stated that even though NGGL’s letter dated 14th December 2009 to the Hon. Minister, MEST, proposed compensation payment of GH¢ 1,000,000.00 in their (NGGL) recognition of the company’s accountability relating to spill, the Panel considered the proposed amount inadequate, hence the GH¢ 7,000,000.00 figure arrived at.
Meanwhile, NGGL has in its response to the fine imposed upon it in a news release indicated its preparedness to finalise compensation for affected parties.
In the release issued last week Monday, it stated that it received notification from the Minister of Environment, Science & Technology of the report by the Ministerial Panel appointed to evaluate the Ahafo Mine Process Solution Overflow accident, which occurred on October 8, 2009.
The company said it is prepared to finalise compensation for the overflow and has already implemented a number of corrective measures to prevent any future process solution releases.
NGGL said in recognition of the overflow’s impact, the company made initial compensation proposals to the Panel, adding that while the report of the Panel recognised that there was no regulatory framework by which to assess compensation or penalties relating to such incidents, it recommended that substantial compensation be paid and Newmont Ghana has stated its intention to meet its compensation obligations, once the process is complete.
Newmont Ghana also has reassured the government and local communities that the safety of its neighbours, employees and the environment is its first priority and that the company is committed to operating with high standards.
Newmont’s Senior Vice President for African Operations, Jeff Huspeni, emphasised, “The Company accepts responsibility for any failure to meet its standards, and we reiterate our regret and apologies for the overflow and for any anxiety caused in the local community over the safety of their drinking water supplies and fish.”
The statement further supplied that Newmont Ghana has rigorously reviewed and modified its control systems and monitoring procedures – with the participation of regulatory agencies – to ensure incidents like this do not happen in the future.
It added that as a result, the company has implemented a number of measures to: reduce the risk of overfilling the event pond during mill shutdowns; improve the reliability of the instrumentation and level detection systems and increase the event pond pumping capacity to redirect process solution more quickly during rain events.
The measures are also to improve containment within the processing plant site in the event other systems fail during a process water overflow; improve and accelerate communication with stakeholders; and, improve onsite protocols and procedures.
Responding to suggestions that the company’s failure to immediately notify government regulators of the overflow were indications of a possible “cover-up,” Mr. Huspeni said that internal communications and assessment failures, along with the operational supervision lapses, resulted in the regulatory agencies not being immediately notified, which may have inadvertently created an appearance of an alleged “cover-up.”
“Our failure to communicate immediately was due, in part, to the fact that our initial assessments mistakenly determined that the overflow was contained within the process plant area. Nevertheless, we should have notified the regulatory authorities immediately, and we apologised for failing to do so. This communication failure was a mistake on our behalf, and we will not let this happen again,” Mr. Huspeni stated. “We are committed to working with the regulatory authorities to improve our reporting protocols and also to review and improve our emergency response mechanisms,” he added.
Recounting to the EPA investigative team the genesis of the spillage, the Process/Metallurgical Manager of NGGL, Johann Vann Hyuston, stated that the plant was shut down between 7th – 9th of October, 2009 for routine annual maintenance ;
On 7th October 2009 , the content of the re- leach thickener containing concentrated of 20ppm of sodium cyanide was emptied into the emergency / event pond ;
On the same day 7th October, 2009 the raw water dam which was said to contain algae and fish was also emptied into the same emergency pond and on the 8th October 2009 supernatant solution from the tailing storage facilities was pumped into the process water pond for re- use during the start up of the plant .
The three ponds including the emergency, process water and the raw water are contiguous and the raw water and the process water ponds have spillway into the emergency/event pond. The ponds were said to be equipped with automatic level monitors, which are computerised and operated from a central control room.
It was stated that at about 13:40 the operators at the control room observed some overflow from the process water pond and the emergency/event pond into the concrete drain, which leads into the environmental control dams (3 and 4 ) i.e . external environment. Having seen the overflow the operator informed the general maintenance foreman and other workers who plugged the culvert that leads from the ponds area with lateritic material. The emergency team doused the area with hypochlorite.
The Operations Manager and the Mill Maintenance Superintendent were said to have inspected the areas, which were perceived to have been affected by the spill.
On their part, the EPA team, after further discussions with the NGGL team indicated that the company’s incidents classification criteria did not warrant immediate disclosure of the spill to regulators and communities and furthermore, the spill, according to the management team, was known to have been contained within the plant.
Conversely, they maintained that the company wrongly traced the direction of the pollutants into the external environment and hence the initial detoxification process was ineffective, while the actual volume of the solution that entered the external environment was unknown.
The EPA team also stated that management of the incident left much to be desired in terms of command and control processes within the mine, relay of information on the incident to communities downstream the spill and the regulatory institutions.
It noted too, that about 855 difference species of fish kill were observed on Saturday, 10th October 2009 after the recorded 50mm rainstorm that occurred on Friday, 9th October 2009, adding that initial sampling did not follow required sampling procedures and protocols as indicated by the Environmental Manager.
To assess the spillage, the EPA team together with NGGL team visited the outlet areas to the system of ponds, where they saw that the culvert said to have been plugged with lateritic material at the time of the incident had not been dislodged. Further, observations made indicated that the quantity of solution spilled as illustrated by the floating balls were far more than what has been estimated by the company.
The team also inspected the wetlands (the company in its presentations refer to the area as ponds ), which received most of the impact that is located about 1.5km from the incident site. The EPA observed that the wetlands area is close to a number of hamlets and the Asundua stream that runs through the wetland was said to be the source of drinking water for the inhabitants in the hamlets. It was also noticed that NGGL has mounted a poly tank near the wetland area and supplies alternative water, which is stored in the tank.
During community csonsultation the team realized that there are a number of hamlets downstream the incident site which are named after the owners, which include Kwame Buo, Kofi Gyaka ,Kofi Boateng, David Kum and Kumi Gyaka.
It was established too that these hamlets were in existence before the commencement of the NGGL’s mining operations.
However the sites have also been inundated with speculative structures, which are likely to mar any genuine claim by the original inhabitants, the team stated. The team spoke with a cross section of the inhabitants of the said hamlets .
It was indicated that some residents spotted some fish kills within the wetlands close to the Asundua stream and they reported to the representatives of the company from the Public Relations Department who were patrolling the area. It was alleged that the company’s representatives initially denied the incident but admitted the incident after spotting some fish kills close to the washing plant. The inhabitants (according to the representatives) pressed for the provision of an alternative water source, to which the company obliged.